

# Armchair Philosophy Naturalized

## —Summary—

Sebastian Lutz\*

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Artificial language philosophy (ALP) as developed by Carnap and others relies on the choice of language in general and the explication of concepts in particular. Although it is usually seen as the paradigmatic armchair philosophy, I argue that it can be and historically has been strongly methodologically naturalistic (that is, reliant exclusively on methods that are used extensively in the sciences). This is not because ALP makes any empirical claims, but because the sciences make extensive use of language choice.

Chang (2004) and Stotz et al. (2004) have shown in case studies how heavily scientific research relies on language choice. I will argue on conceptual grounds that it has to: The semantics for scientific theories that Andreas (2010) has developed allows the identification of meaning postulates that are free of any empirical implications and therefore can be chosen to be true. An argument against taking the Ramsey-sentences of a theory to represent the theory itself (Demopoulos 2003) shows the extent of this language choice. A purported counterargument (Papineau 2009) relies on an incorrect reading of the Carnap-Sentence.

Therefore, ALP can be methodologically naturalistic by choosing languages the way that the sciences do. Historically, this is how ALP has been pursued.

## References

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\*Theoretical Philosophy Unit, Utrecht University. sebastian.lutz@gmx.net.

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